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WHO SHOULD BE A PARENT? PARENTHOOD AND THE SIG-
NIFICANCE OF REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
 
Claire Junga Kim1
Abstract: The various reproductive technologies have expanded the power people have to control their bodily function. 
Because these technologies have brought new configurations of people whose role is central to the reproductive process, 
ambiguities about the attribution of parenthood have emerged. I insist that the intentional account among four explanatory 
frameworks for parenthood gains more validity, as opportunities to exert intention increase. I extend the intentional account, 
using Scanlon’s explanation of the “Value of Choice.” In the Value of Choice, Scanlon explains that choice has a justificatory 
power; that is, by the fact of having choice, one accepts the normative consequences of one’s decision. The current changes in 
reproduction technologies mean that there are several conditions to choose. While maintaining justificatory power from the 
Value of Choice, the intentional account becomes inclusive enough to encompass the status quo, plausible even in situations 
where intention does not exist or is not exerted. 
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¿Quién debería ser padre? Paternidad y la importancia de elección reproductiva
Resumen: La variedad de tecnologías reproductivas han expandido el poder que las personas tienen para controlar su función 
corporal. Debido a que estas tecnologías han producido nuevas configuraciones de personas cuyo papel es central para el proceso 
reproductivo, han emergido ambigüedades sobre la atribución de paternidad. Insisto en que dar cuenta de la intencionalidad en 
la paternidad dentro de cuatro estructuras explicativas gana mayor validez en la medida en que se incrementan las oportunidades 
de ejercer intención. Extiendo el dar cuenta de la intención usando la explicación de Scanlon sobre el “Valor de la Elección”, 
en la cual la elección tiene un poder de justificación; esto es, por el hecho de haber elegido, uno acepta las consecuencias 
normativas de su decisión. Los cambios actuales en tecnologías de reproducción significan que existen varias condiciones para 
elegir; mientras que se mantiene el poder de justificación por el Valor de Elección, el dar cuenta de la intención llega a ser lo 
suficientemente inclusivo para abarcar el statu quo, plausible incluso en situaciones donde no existe intención o no se expresa.
Palabras clave: padres, estatus de paternidad, reproducción, tecnología reproductiva, técnicas de reproducción asistida
Quem deve ser um pai? Paternidade e a importância da escolha reprodutiva  
Resumo: As várias tecnologias reprodutivas expandiram o poder que as pessoas têm de controlar suas funções corporais. Porque 
estas tecnologias trouxeram novas configurações de pessoas cujo papel é fundamental para o processo reprodutivo, ambiguidades 
emergiram sobre a atribuição da paternidade. Eu insisto que a consideração intencional entre quatro quadros explicativos para 
a paternidade ganha mais validade, quando oportunidades de exercer a intenção de aumentam. Eu estendo a consideração 
intencional, utilizando a explicação de Scanlon, do “Valor de escolha”. Scanlon explica que a escolha tem um poder de justi-
ficação; ou seja, pelo fato de ter uma escolha, um aceita as consequências normativas de uma decisão. As atuais mudanças em 
tecnologias de reprodução significam que existem várias condições para escolher. Enquanto mantendo o poder de justificação 
do valor da escolha, a consideração intencional torna-se suficientemente inclusiva para abranger o status quo, plausível mesmo 
em situações onde uma intenção não existe ou não é exercida.
Palavras-chave: pais, status de paternidade, reprodução, tecnologia reprodutiva, técnicas de reprodução assistidas 
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Introduction
Developments in the technology of reproduction 
have created new opportunities for many people 
and, as a result, brought philosophical questions 
into an area that has hardly been given serious 
thought. Until recently, the questions and an-
swers concerning parenthood were relatively 
simple, compare to highly abstract ideas such as 
justice; people have believe that they can justifi-
ably identify in most cases who can claim parent-
hood and on what basis the claim rests. However, 
technological advances and their proliferations, 
such as assisted reproductive technology (ART) 
and various contraceptive methods, are triggering 
events that have not been experienced in human 
history, and making people consider the essence 
of parenthood as well. To help resolve the issue 
of parental responsibility and to draw a line on 
permissible reproductive action, people need a 
concept of parenthood founded on a stable basis.
There are four competing frameworks for defin-
ing parenthood in general: genetic, gestational, 
causal, and intentional accounts(1). In the cur-
rent era of technology that enables people to exert 
intention, I suggest that the intentional account 
(in which the intention of an individual involved 
in the reproductive process plays a crucial role in 
determining parenthood) has more plausibility. 
However, the intentional account, like the oth-
ers, has an inherent weakness of being unable to 
embrace and explain all cases of reproduction. 
Certainly, there seem to be many more pregnan-
cies that are not consciously intended by poten-
tial parent(s) than those that are intended (and 
therefore fit the intentional account). I believe 
that Scanlon’s assertion of the Value of Choice(2), 
which explains the significance of choice and 
its role in justifying a moral principle, can shed 
new light on and solve the problem. Identifying 
the values of reproductive choices and drawing 
justificatory power from them would help to le-
gitimately assign parental responsibility based on 
their opportunity to make choices about repro-
duction. I first start by introducing the four ac-
counts of parenthood and then take a brief look 
at Scanlon’s Value of Choice. I argue that, based 
on the insight provided by Scanlon’s analysis of 
choice, one can extend the intentional account 
and reinforce its plausibility.
New conflicts: the need to found parenthood 
on a solid basis
A changed reproductive environment raises a seri-
ous question as to the conventional way of assign-
ing parenthood and to the justification for such 
assignment. This is because the power and scope 
of influence that new technologies trigger are not 
limited to potential parents, who have already 
been recognized in the traditional reproductive 
setting, but extend to new settings that include 
other people who have not been recognized as po-
tential parents in the traditional way. These new 
reproductive settings and newly involved parties 
create situations in which pre-existing norms 
cannot apply. For example, the clinic setting for 
ART involves many participants, such as doctors, 
gamete donors, and surrogate mothers. Not sur-
prisingly, those who are brought in to the process 
of reproduction by new technologies sometimes 
conflict with each other about parental rights and 
responsibility in terms of both their very existence 
and their extent2. When a surrogate mother gives 
birth, she may claim custody and a dispute with 
the commissioning couple may ensue. In the case 
of preventing pregnancy too, there can be a con-
flict between parties with different intentions, 
especially when a man and woman in a sexual re-
lationship have the same intention originally but 
one or other change their mind when faced with 
unintended consequences, such as an unexpected 
pregnancy. 
Furthermore, we need an account of parenthood 
to prescribe the boundaries of permissible acts of 
reproduction. As one does in the development 
of technology in other areas too, we come to ask 
2 Here I primarily focus on parenthood as a responsibility or duty, 
but eventually this also implies parenthood as a parental right. Be-
cause thorough explanation of and justification for this endorsement 
of parental right lies beyond the scope of this article, I only assert 
a link between choice, responsibility, and right. These concepts are 
intimately interconnected, with the enlargement of one triggering 
the enlargement of the others. I consider the concept of parental 
right an instrument that is drawn up to guarantee that parents can 
perform their role without undue interruption from others. My 
view can be classified as a “priority” thesis according to the classifica-
tion of Benatar and Archard(3). Explaining the rights and duties 
of parenthood, Benatar and Archard classify three approaches: the 
“parental package” thesis; the “no parental right” thesis; and the “pri-
ority” thesis. The priority thesis admits that there are parental rights 
but regards these as subordinate to parental duties. Since I think the 
right is subordinate to the responsibility, my discussion in this paper 
concentrates on parenthood as a responsibility.
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ourselves whether it is permissible to do what is 
technically possible. This question, in the area of 
reproduction, is closely linked with the question 
of parenthood. One has to ask first, “Do they 
qualify for parenthood?” before asking, “Is it per-
missible for them to participate in this reproduc-
tive act and create a child?” This is a prospective 
question that draws a line for justifiable action. 
In order to answer it, it is necessary to apply the 
standard explanation for appropriate parenthood 
and the qualities needed to achieve it. 
All these cases raise questions about parenthood. 
Deciding who, among the involved parties, 
should be regarded as a parent, and on what ba-
sis we should decide their parenthood, becomes 
more and more important. The significance of 
answering these questions about parenthood 
originates, to some extent, from the social need 
to ensure that newly born future citizens receive 
adequate care for an adequate length of time. 
Stable parenthood is crucial for children’s growth. 
Therefore, the social need to provide stability trig-
gers an effort to secure a firm basis for parenthood 
that is constant even when the status quo is char-
acterized by rapid change. 
Four accounts of parenthood
Four competing perspectives of parenthood have 
been presented to satisfy the social needs men-
tioned earlier. These four perspectives are genetic, 
gestational, causal, and intentional accounts(1). 
A genetic account relies on the genetic relation-
ship from which the child’s genetic component 
was directly derived. The gestational account 
relies on the relationship that the child and the 
provider of their intra-uterine life —namely, the 
birth mother— have. The causal account relies on 
the causation of the existence of the child. The 
intentional account relies on the intention to ful-
fill the “begetting, bearing, and rearing” of the 
child(4).
Each account has its own limit in capturing all 
cases of reproduction. Given the highly devel-
oped technology with which one can exert one’s 
reproductive intention, the genetic and gestation-
al accounts seem to face many counter-examples 
and lose the validity that they once enjoyed. Even 
though children bear a genetic similarity to their 
parents in most current families and that similar-
ity is derived from their parents, there are other 
socially constructed factors, such as society’s rec-
ognition of the family and genetic contributors’ 
fulfillment of duty. Moreover, there have long 
been cases of adoption where, without a genetic 
relationship, other socially constructed factors 
can constitute sufficient grounds for parenthood. 
These cases show that genetic factors themselves 
may have moral significance to a certain extent, 
but they are not overriding compared with other 
concepts. For example, in the unusual situation 
of gamete donation, it is more acceptable for the 
nature of the account to rely on moral concepts 
that are adopted in broader areas of our moral 
life rather than within the restricted area of the 
family. 
The gestational account also suffers from a flaw 
in justification. Although this account might be 
seen as having a similarity to the concept of des-
ert or entitlement, which is a familiar concept in 
moral philosophy, it has different features from 
most other cases in which the concept of desert 
or entitlement is applied. Other desert or enti-
tlement-applied conditions only recognize people 
who put their efforts into what they have decided. 
At some point in time, there should have been a 
decision. If there is no choice or decision at all, 
not even an implicit one, mere input of effort 
cannot be recognized. Moreover, considering the 
changed situation of reproduction, there are peo-
ple who agree to gestate a baby, but not to rear it 
as their child —for example, a surrogate mother. 
Here, one should acknowledge that the concept 
of desert or entitlement is not always applicable 
to gestation. Therefore, there are significant limi-
tations in applying the concept of desert and jus-
tifying gestational accounts. 
The causal account blurs the distinction between 
moral responsibility and causal responsibility. 
While imposition of parental responsibility as a 
moral responsibility is one thing, the fact that one 
has contributed to the causation of human cre-
ation is another. We do not always elicit normative 
outcomes from mere causation. Some normative 
process has to be combined with the causation. 
This is clearly shown in the situation where we 
have to “select” a person to become the parent of 
a child from the many people who contributed to 
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“causing the child”3. For example, in the case of 
IVF reproduction, more than six people may have 
contributed to the creation of a new human life: 
each gamete donor for sperm and egg, surrogate 
mother, commissioning mother and father, clini-
cian and other medical professionals who assisted 
the procedure. Obviously, these are too many for 
all to be the parents of the child. Something that 
can provide justification of parenthood is needed.
Contrary to the views mentioned earlier, the in-
tentional account is capable of justifying the en-
titlement of parenthood and consequent parental 
duties. This is because this view is based on the 
moral significance of choice, which is largely ac-
cepted in moral philosophy as well as in our daily 
lives. Furthermore, in emphasizing the intention 
to rear a child, the intentional account is in accor-
dance with the purpose of parenthood, which is 
to guarantee the welfare of the future generation. 
However, the intentional account also suffers 
from criticism that the scope of cases in which it 
can be successfully applied is too limited. To be 
sure, there are many cases (or even far more cases) 
in which potential parents have no intention to 
beget, bear, or rear a child when they are engaged 
in sexual acts, although they nevertheless become 
parents(5,6). How can an intentionalist explain 
parenthood in these circumstances? I believe 
Scanlon’s idea of the Value of Choice can resolve 
this problem of intentional account and make the 
account more inclusive. In the following section, 
I briefly summarize his concept of the Value of 
Choice and apply it to parenthood.
The value of choice
Scanlon’s analysis of the relation between choice 
and responsibility is part of his larger theory of 
contractualism, or the theory of “what we owe to 
each other”. This means that a contract among 
parties who are “moved by the aim of finding 
principles that others, similarly motivated, could 
3 Fuscaldo(5) points out this drawback of strictly causal accounts. 
To overcome it, she insists that two conditions should be satisfied: 
the consequence needs be 1. foreseeable, and 2. to be caused by the 
causer’s free action. By limiting the causal account with these condi-
tions, she narrows the issue down from causal responsibility to moral 
responsibility. However, contrary to her emphasis on causal relation-
ship, I insist that the stress be put on the intention, or the choice. I 
further consider the conditions she proposes as the prerequisite for 
intention or choice.
not reasonably reject”(2:5) derives its justification 
for principle, and presumably for the burden of 
abiding by that principle, from the fact that the 
parties had the opportunity to choose. Scanlon(7) 
first shows the “obvious and immediate signifi-
cance” of choice, the Value of Choice, and then 
associates it with responsibility. Because of the 
generic reasons that “people have for wanting to 
have what happens depend on the way that they 
respond when presented with alternatives under 
the right conditions(2:251)”4, we bear a burden 
following the principle that we had an opportu-
nity to avoid.
Scanlon identifies three values as these generic 
reasons: instrumental, representative, and sym-
bolic. Instrumental value is the value that we im-
mediately come up with when we think about 
the Value of Choice. It is instrumentally efficient 
for us to have an opportunity to choose to real-
ize our future satisfaction. Representative value, 
Scanlon claims(2:253), is satisfied when one can 
reflect one’s thought, judgment, “taste, imagina-
tion, and power of discrimination and analysis 
through making choices.” The example he offers 
is choosing a gift. Even though the gift might not 
give the receiver as much satisfaction as if the re-
ceiver had chosen the object themselves, the fact 
that the giver chose the gift represents the giver’s 
attitude to the receiver and the event. Symbolic 
value means that, by making their own choice, 
the person is sometimes identified as being a 
competent adult member of society. Examples of 
these kinds of choices range from lifelong influ-
ences, such as career and marriage, to relatively 
short-term influences, like a decision making on a 
medical matter. What Scanlon emphasizes is that 
the Value of Choice is not limited to mere instru-
mental value. Representative and symbolic values 
show that, even when the choice does not seem 
to contribute to the agent’s welfare, satisfaction, 
or enjoyment of achieving an objective, it still has 
moral significance.
The condition of choice
When deriving responsibility from choice, Scan-
lon(7) identifies two factors in choice —“some-
4 Generic reasons are those that can be generalized to individuals in 
a situation of a certain kind. To make the principle universal, Scan-
lon(2:255) avoids particularity and use the term “generic reasons”.
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thing that an agent does”: namely, an action, and 
“what an agent is presented with”: namely, a con-
dition. This clarification avoids focusing only on 
the last step of choice: the explicit consent or the 
act of choice. The fact that one has a condition to 
choose plays an essential role in choice and can-
not recede into the background. Moreover, Scan-
lon claims that sometimes the condition itself is 
sufficient to justify responsibility for the conse-
quence. 
According to the Value of Choice account what 
matters is the value of the opportunity to choose 
that the person is presented with. If a person has 
been placed in a sufficiently good position, this 
can make it the case that he or she has no valid 
complaint about what results, whether or not it is 
produced by his or her active choice(2:258).
Therefore, when trying to recognize the Value of 
Choice, it is more valid to appreciate the signifi-
cance of the conditions to choose than to be pre-
occupied with whether they involve active choice 
or not. With regard to conditions, Scanlon lists 
a set of alternatives, their relative desirability, the 
information available to the agent, and so on. 
Therefore, whether we have a set of desirable al-
ternatives and adequate information about the al-
ternatives will decide whether we can draw power 
from the Value of Choice and justify assigning 
parental responsibility. In other words, the con-
ditions in reproduction will decide the appro-
priateness of assigning parenthood. Now we can 
go back to parenthood issues and examine more 
fully the value and role of choice in reproduction, 
recognizing the significance of the fact that one 
has a sufficiently good condition to choose.
The value of reproductive choice
The Value of Choice also exists in the area of 
reproduction. Moreover, the importance and 
far-reaching influence of choice requires one to 
recognize and consider the value of reproductive 
choice as paramount, and not be preoccupied by 
choice’s instrumental values. 
First, choices in reproduction have an instru-
mental value that makes the future more likely 
to be enjoyable for the person who has made the 
choice. Regardless of what kind of future the per-
son wants, it is efficient in terms of the chance to 
have alternatives and to be able to make a choice. 
In procreation and contraception too, choice can 
be an efficient instrument in realizing a poten-
tial parent’s wish. The role of parent changes the 
pattern of one’s life dramatically. Choice enables 
one to decide for or against this change in lifestyle 
pattern by oneself, and thereby to increase the 
chance of merging one’s ideal future with reality. 
What people choose in dreaming their ideal fu-
ture is not constrained whether to have a baby (or 
not to have a baby); it also includes their dream 
family, their role as parent, and their maturation 
through the experience of being a parent. 
Second, reproductive choices have a represen-
tative value. For example, any married couple 
without children is annoyed by persistently be-
ing asked, “Why don’t you have a baby?” What 
is apparent in this case is that the choice of be-
coming a parent can be representative evidence 
of the reproductive agent’s conformist view. One 
can also find representative value of reproductive 
choice in linking the fact of the agent’s being a 
parent to the stable and successful status of the 
agent. Moreover, having children can represent a 
person’s fundamental values, such as their value 
judgment on life in this world, which is far more 
a comprehensive judgment than conformity with 
existing arrangements or a state of prosperity. It is 
natural to examine how a future child might feel 
about their life and this world into which they 
are born, when one decides whether or not to 
procreate. This examination leads one to the fun-
damental question of the value of life as a whole 
and to the moral requirement to make a choice 
in accordance with one’s view of that fundamen-
tal question. For example, it is absurd, or at least 
selfish, for a pessimistic person who thinks life in 
this world is not worth living to choose to create 
a child. Hence, it is valid to consider one’s choice 
on procreation as an opportunity to represent 
how one judges and values life in this world. In 
relation to contraception and abortion too, the 
decision not to have a child shows one’s value 
judgment that it is not desirable for one to have a 
child now for ethical, economic, or other reasons. 
Therefore, through making choices, we have an 
opportunity to express our value judgments to so-
ciety, our future children, and ourselves. 
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Third, reproductive choices have symbolic mean-
ings. In the same way that one can easily find a 
number of taboos on sexual behaviors in any so-
ciety, the act of reproduction has been the sub-
ject of much symbolic value and is only permit-
ted for adults in most societies. In other words, 
controlling one’s body and desire in reproductive 
actions, and being responsible men and women, 
have long been critical aspects of maturity, and 
thus have had a symbolic meaning. Making a 
choice on reproductive actions and harmonizing 
one’s choice with social norms shows that one is 
a competent and independent member of society. 
The act we are concerned with is not restricted 
to sexual intercourse, of course. However, bring-
ing a child into this world and taking care of that 
child have significant meanings in the value sys-
tem of a society, and this may be the fundamental 
reason why sexual intercourse is associated with 
taboos. In this regard, symbolic values can be as-
cribed accordingly to altered forms and goals of 
reproduction, such as ART and various methods 
of contraception. 
The condition of reproductive choice
Even though, as shown earlier, the intentional ac-
count successfully draws justificatory power from 
the Value of Choice, the apparently limited scope 
of the account has been recognized as a major 
drawback. It seems obvious that there is an un-
intended consequence of reproduction that is still 
the result of a voluntary action. When intention 
does not exist or is not exerted, but a new human 
life nevertheless comes into being, the intentional 
account seems to face trouble and be defeated by 
the causal account. However, even in this para-
digmatic case in which the intentional account 
seems to reveal its limitations, the significance of 
the condition itself can provide justification for 
assigning parental responsibility. In other words, 
if we extend our focus on the explicit act of inten-
tion to include the opportunity to choose, we can 
have a coherent view that is inclusive enough to 
embrace the status quo, while we maintain the 
normative power of the choice.
For many moral agents, the current reproduc-
tive environment with its many technologies 
has become a sufficient condition to choose and 
the tendency is getting stronger. Reproductive 
consequences, to a certain extent, are not just 
foreseeable but also controllable, thanks to the 
technologies. With this control, it is fair to judge 
“not doing in certain way even though he could 
have done otherwise if he had so willed”(8:40) 
as accepting the certain foreseeable consequence. 
For example, if a heterosexual couple could have 
freely talked about their individual wishes and de-
sirable futures in terms of procreation, and then 
employed reliable contraceptive methods accord-
ing to their decision, but did not, then one can 
assume that their inaction or omission is to some 
extent representing their acceptance of the pos-
sible consequence of pregnancy. 
It might seem onerous to assume intention to be-
come a parent and rear a child from sex without 
contraception. Nonetheless, there is second rea-
son to consider current reproductive environment 
as a sufficient condition to choose. Now we have 
multiple chances to exert our intention in terms 
of reproduction. These include the opportunity 
to reverse the prior intention presented through 
the prior action or inaction. The couple can rein-
state their intention, if becoming parents was not 
their original intention. In fact, the times when 
people choose their future in terms of reproduc-
tion and parenthood are multiple and sequential. 
However, we sometimes recognize only some 
of those times, such as pre-conception decision 
making, and overlook the fact that potential par-
ents can make their decisions at other times too 
– for example, during post-conception decision 
making. In the case of sex without contraception, 
a couple can exert their intention even after con-
ception, by using the morning-after pill or having 
an abortion5. This can also be the case when the 
intention is exerted long before the conception. 
In many conservative societies, or subgroups of 
society, decisions about marriage and procreation 
come in a package. Once one makes a decision 
and enters the “normal” lifestyle of that society, 
such as a marital life with a partner of the oppo-
5 Of course, it is the case only when each of these alternatives is per-
mitted from society’s legal system and one’s own value system. And 
I think that the situation has become permissive and this tendency 
(of being increasingly permissive) will continue. However, the fact 
that one have these alternatives can bring about extremely demand-
ing obligation to use the alternative. For example, in the case of 
preconception negligence, if premises on the moral status of embryo 
or fetus and on the obligation to revise the former negligence are 
added, it can imply that the woman has to receive an abortion(9).
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site sex, other normal options follow. Procreation 
and child rearing are two of such normal options. 
Therefore, we can certainly say that choice about 
reproduction often occurs long before the actual 
exertion of intention, when one chooses some-
thing other than reproduction, but accompanies 
reproduction frequently. To summarize, the vari-
ous and serial options that reproductive technol-
ogy makes available to us constitute sufficient 
conditions to choose. 
The fact that the number of capable agents in re-
production has increased is also important. In a 
normative dimension, it is important to consider 
what a reasonable agent can expect of others and 
of themselves. This is because one judges the sig-
nificance of an act, and sometimes the permissi-
bility or blameworthiness of an act, based on rea-
sonable expectations; we compare what happens 
to us with what we reasonably expected. One 
should examine first whether one’s expectations 
can be applied universally. As I described earlier, 
more people have become involved in the repro-
ductive environment. They include couples with 
azoospermia and ovarian dysfunction. Moreover, 
the number is likely to increase further. In many 
countries, Homosexual couples who want biolog-
ically related babies have come to realize this de-
sire. These increases will definitely have an impact 
on the levels of reasonable expectation of people 
in the reproductive sphere. It means that people 
not only come to have the sufficient condition to 
choose but also come to learn that others have 
the same. Normative consequences follow: peo-
ple will assume and assign parental responsibility 
based on the fact of choice.
Conclusion
The changed reproductive situation supports the 
intentional account by increasing the chances 
of people exerting intention, and the number 
of people who can do so. We can see clearly the 
plausibility of this framework if we broaden the 
focus from the pre-conception explicit expression 
of intention towards various forms of exertion, at 
various points in time. The problem of “no par-
ent” according to the strict version of intentional 
account can be solved by recognition of the Val-
ue of Choice and the condition of choice in the 
changed reproductive situation. Therefore, more 
than at any other time in history, what makes a 
parent become a parent is the intention to be a 
parent. 
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